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Lukashenko wants to preserve his political "course" even after his departure or death Deputy Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Artsiom Brukhan , discussed the changes in the power system that Lukashenko plans to implement during a broadcast on the "Svaboda Premium" channel. Belarus's political system remains super-presidential: although Lukashenko introduced constitutional amendments in 2022 that created formal checks and balances, the role of the "president" remains decisive. On the surface, the system appears to be becoming more collective, but in practice, everything remains under Lukashenko’s strict control. Granting the so-called "All-Belarusian People's Assembly" the status of a constitutional body and expanding the powers of local authorities seem more like an effort to strengthen the authoritarian structure rather than a genuine attempt to delegate power to real collegial bodies. The idea of "collective governance" and increasing the role of new "collective" institutions, such as the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly, remains purely symbolic for now. This is not about a real separation of powers but rather about reinforcing the power vertical, as Lukashenko continues to combine two positions.  Theoretically, these new bodies could influence politics, but in reality, they remain under Lukashenko’s direct control. As long as he is alive and occupies the usurped presidency, no real changes can be expected. At the same time, the creation of structures intended to ensure the continuation of power after Lukashenko’s departure represents an attempt to guarantee the preservation of his internal and external political course and maintain elite unity around the regime. Lukashenko is essentially laying the groundwork for a system that could carry on his policies even in his absence. However, it is unlikely that such pseudo-institutions would be able to function without his direct involvement.  Lukashenko's vision of institutionalizing power boils down to creating a more complex governance system that remains entirely dependent on his personal rule. Elite competition could only emerge if he were to leave the scene, raising doubts about the sustainability of his institutional framework. The fundamental issue lies in the lack of genuine democratic competition and institutional independence. All attempts to create "collective" structures today remain, in essence, mere tools for strengthening his personalist system. At the same time, the foundation is being laid for preserving Lukashenko's political course even after his departure.

Pavel Pavlovich Latushka:  Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Representative of the Cabinet for Power Transition, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, and Leader of the "Latushka Team and Movement 'For Freedom'" faction within the 3rd convocation of the Coordination Council. How the West Can Counteract Lukashenko’s Regime Cooperation with Iran Under the rule of dictator Lukashenko, Belarus has long ceased to be merely a satellite of Russia. Now, the dictatorial regime is rapidly integrating into the global club of autocracies, including Iran – a state that finances terrorism and supplies Russia with deadly drones. While Lukashenko once merely followed Putin's orders, he is now becoming an active participant in a global alliance of democracy's enemies. Recent facts presented in an article by Jack Rush in the American publication War on the Rocks , which specializes in security issues, prove that Belarus is pursuing close military-technical cooperation with Tehran. Minsk is not only ready to supply drones to the Russian army but may also become a key hub in the production of Iranian Shahed-136 drones. This makes Belarus not just a war accomplice but a real factor in global destabilization. The Belarus-Iran Partnership Has Been Decades in the Making After Lukashenko found himself isolated internationally in 1997, he sought to build warmer relations with regimes that had been isolated for decades, including Iran. The particularly close ties between the regimes in Minsk and Tehran began when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became Iran's president in 2005. In the second half of the 2000s, cooperation between the regimes strengthened and became more ideological, based on mutual hostility toward the West, as well as shared concerns about the political stability and survival of both dictatorships. At that time, in exchange for promises of participation in oil development and investments, Lukashenko supported Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Lukashenko's attempt to support research and development of Iran’s ballistic missile program in 2011 ultimately led to international sanctions against Belarus. However, military cooperation between Iran and Belarus has only strengthened, particularly through their shared support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Since the start of the war, both regimes have become two of Moscow’s most loyal allies. Belarus Became a Mediator in Military Cooperation Between Russia and Iran In particular, Jack Rush’s article mentions that the 2023 bilateral agreement between Belarus and Iran includes provisions for Belarus to begin producing Shahed-136 drones, a model that is crucial for Russia’s battlefield capabilities in Ukraine. In July 2024, Belarusian military officials presented the “Nomad” drone, which is ostensibly a local development but strikingly similar to the Shahed-136. According to the author of the article, Russia may soon exert pressure on Iran to accelerate drone production in Belarus. In November 2024, a high-ranking Belarusian military delegation visited an Iranian military university that conducts research and development of unmanned aerial vehicles. Further military cooperation between Tehran and Minsk is expected later this year. This makes Belarus not just an accomplice in war but a real factor in global destabilization. How the West Can Counter the Growing Partnership Between Iran and Lukashenko’s Regime To counter the growing partnership between Iran and Lukashenko’s regime, Western countries need to contain these developments. One important tool for such containment, according to the author, is sanctions, particularly those targeting Iran and Lukashenko’s regime by cutting off key resources and financial assets. It is also necessary to improve existing sanctions by closing loopholes and ensuring that violations of restrictions do not go unchecked. In addition to sanctions, another way to limit the production of Iranian drones in Belarus would be a clear warning from Ukraine regarding Lukashenko. These actions should be taken “in conjunction with efforts to assist the Belarusian people in opposing Lukashenko’s regime by revoking international recognition of his presidency and supporting activities among NGOs and the Belarusian diaspora,” writes the author. Conclusion: The Regimes in Minsk and Tehran Are Cut from the Same Cloth Against this backdrop, in early February, U.S. President Donald Trump decided to resume the “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran. As explained by a representative of the Trump administration and U.S. ambassador to the UN, America will work with key allies to reinstate international sanctions and restrictions on Iran. It is believed that Lukashenko is likely to face new sanctions for his cooperation with Iran if he does not cease his dangerous dealings. According to The Wall Street Journal , even before his election, Donald Trump planned to drastically tighten sanctions against Iran after taking office and limit Iranian oil sales. Just recently, the U.S. president stated that countries like Iran should not be allowed to possess nuclear weapons. He emphasized, “We cannot allow other countries to get nuclear weapons, not just Iran.” And we remember that just recently, Lukashenko boasted about the "red nuclear button" he received from Putin, while military officials in his regime said they were ready to host the so-called “Nutshell” missile. How to Stop the Threat? The World Must Act Decisively In our opinion, ignoring the “Moscow – Minsk – Tehran” axis is fraught with catastrophic consequences. The West must intensify sanctions, fully cutting off financial and technological pathways through which Lukashenko’s regime receives resources. Only strict measures, including international isolation and non-recognition of his rule, can limit the dictator’s ability to contribute to global destabilization. Furthermore, it is important that Ukraine and its allies send a clear message to Lukashenko: assisting Moscow and Iran in the war will lead to consequences not only economically but also militarily. Lukashenko is betting on cooperation with terrorist regimes — therefore, the world must treat him accordingly.

Pavel Pavlovich Latushka:  Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Representative of the Cabinet for Power Transition, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, and Leader of the "Latushka Team and Movement 'For Freedom'" faction within the 3rd convocation of the Coordination Council. Have you noticed how housing and utility costs keep rising? Have you seen how much heavier your utility bills have become? Every year, the so-called "authorities" claim that Belarusians cover only a small portion of housing and utility service costs, while the vast majority of expenses are generously compensated by the "state" — almost as if Lukashenko himself is paying from his own pocket. It’s a clever trick: they constantly raise the prices but present it as if they’re doing us a "favor," a "gesture of goodwill." They make it seem as if we should be "grateful" — after all, they "could have" raised the prices even higher. This is nothing but manipulation. Over the past ten years, statements from the "dictator" and his "associates" suggest that the percentage of housing and utility service costs allegedly covered by the "state" is constantly increasing — sometimes "52%", sometimes "30%," then "20%," then "18%" — yet at the same time, people are paying more and more. How is this possible? Let’s look at this from another angle. Who exactly is this "state" that so generously covers our bills? The answer is simple: the "state" is us, and the money it uses comes from our "taxes." "Taxes" are the main source of revenue for the Belarusian "budget," from which utility expenses are paid. This means that it is our money — our own contributions to the "state treasury" — funding these so-called "compensations." No matter how much Lukashenko tries to take credit for it, we are the ones footing the bill. So, in the end, what exactly is "state propaganda" selling when it praises this supposedly "efficient state" that covers our costs? The answer is simple: "propaganda" is selling us "air". It’s selling us "nothing". Even the "cheap energy resources" from the dictator’s "main partner" — Russia — haven’t stopped prices from rising, despite Lukashenko plunging the country deeper into "dependence" on Putin. Where is the promised "benefit" of the Belarusian Nuclear Power Plant ("BelNPP"), which was supposed to reduce energy costs for the population? We’ve already inherited all the "risks" of having a "nuclear station" on our territory, but where are the "savings"? The conclusion is clear: Lukashenko is becoming more and more "expensive" for Belarusians. The next time you pay your "utility bills" and take money out of your wallet, remember this: at that very moment, Lukashenko is "relaxing" in one of his "18 luxurious residences." At the same time, another "apartment" is being built for someone in his vast "security apparatus," and more funds are being allocated for "state propaganda" — propaganda that will continue to sell "empty promises," insisting that you are the one "not paying enough". This raises a rhetorical question: are "we" really "underpaying", or is it the "state" that is failing to do its "job"? The reality is that Lukashenko is the one "failing" — and he is also the one "not paying his fair share". Yet, through his controlled "propaganda machine", he continues to push the narrative of a "social state". But the truth is undeniable: every year, more and more "money" is being taken from the "pockets of Belarusians" for "utility payments". And everyone in Belarus must remember who is truly responsible for this. The blame lies squarely with the "dictator himself".

The Lukashenko regime continues to pay a high price for its loyalty to the Kremlin. Belarus, which has become a gray area for Russia to bypass sanctions and a military foothold, is once again at the center of tough economic restrictions. The new EU sanctions package sends a clear message: support for Russian aggression, involvement in military supplies, and the intensification of internal repression will not go unanswered. Lukashenko has chosen the path of isolation and dependence on Moscow. The new sanctions package  targets key areas of the economy, trade, and industry and strengthens the control over the enforcement of existing restrictions. The new package further harmonizes trade sanctions against Lukashenko's regime and Russia . One of the central elements of the new sanctions package is the expansion of the list of goods banned for export and import. Specifically, the EU now bans the supply of goods to Belarus that contribute to military and technological development, including components used by Russia in its war against Ukraine. The following items are now under sanctions: Chemical precursors used in riot control agents, Software for numerical control equipment, Controllers used in drones, Chemical elements, pyrotechnic products, and flammable materials. To minimize the risk of circumventing the sanctions, the list of goods and technologies prohibited for transit through Belarus has also been expanded , particularly those that could strengthen Belarus' military-industrial capabilities. The EU has also introduced a new criterion for inclusion in the sanctions list: supporting or benefiting from Belarus' defense industry. The EU has imposed strict limitations on the development of Belarus' energy sector. The sale, supply, transfer, and export of software related to oil and gas exploration are now prohibited. This will significantly hinder the regime's capabilities in mineral extraction and exploration, while minimizing the risk of circumventing the sanctions via Belarus. Sanctions have also targeted software that could be used for enterprise management and industrial design. This means that the regime will no longer be able to obtain: Enterprise management systems, Software for industrial design and production. Moreover, the transfer of intellectual property and commercial secrets related to these programs is now prohibited. This will seriously limit the technological development of the regime's defense industry, its manufacturing sector, and the government apparatus. The new sanctions package also affects the import of primary aluminum. This is important because Belarus was used as a transit point for Russia to bypass sanctions on this metal. The EU is taking decisive steps to eliminate the possibility of sanction evasion, including through the use of crypto assets. Under the new package, stringent requirements are being introduced for companies, which now must: Report suspicious transactions to financial intelligence units, Provide any information about potential sanctions violations within two weeks of receiving it. Additionally, liability is being established for European companies operating outside the EU, including subsidiaries in Belarus. This means that the Belarusian regime will not be able to use foreign companies to circumvent sanctions. Despite the tough economic restrictions, the EU is taking steps to support Belarus' civil society. In particular, the possibility of transporting cash for personal needs remains. There are also exemptions for humanitarian and medical purposes. "The new sanctions show that Belarus, because of Lukashenko, is turning into an appendage of Russia's military machine. The EU aims to close the loopholes for sanctions evasion and stop fueling the dictators' military economies. It is important to understand that all these sanctions were imposed because Lukashenko supports Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Europe will not turn a blind eye to the crimes of Lukashenko's regime, its support for Russian aggression, and internal repression.  However, despite the tough measures, Europe continues to support Belarus' civil society, showing that the country's future should not depend on the Kremlin and its puppets. All restrictions will remain in place and will only intensify until democratic changes occur in Belarus" , said Pavel Latushka.

"We strongly recommend all Belarusian banks disconnect from the Russian Bank’s Financial Messaging System (SPFS) to avoid secondary EU sanctions and focus their efforts not on supporting Lukashenko's dictatorial regime and its repressive policies, but on working in the interests of Belarusian citizens and the national economy. Continuing to assist in sanctions evasion brings Belarusian banks closer to restrictive measures that could affect the stability of Belarus’s financial system. I appeal to you, Pavel Vladimirovich Kallaur, as the head of the National Bank of Belarus: You can change course. Refuse to support a regime that places Lukashenko’s personal ambitions above national interests and focus on the real protection of Belarus’s financial and economic independence" , urged Pavel Latushka . On December 11, 2023, Pavel Latushka met in Brussels with the EU Special Representative for Sanctions, David O'Sullivan . The parties discussed a range of issues related to sanctions pressure on Lukashenko's regime. During the meeting, the need for the isolation of the SPFS, which is the Russian equivalent of SWIFT, was voiced. Subsequently, the National Anti-Crisis Management (NAU) provided a detailed justification for the necessity of imposing sanctions on SPFS and its role in circumventing already imposed restrictions. As a result, the EU, in its next sanctions package on June 24, 2024, introduced a ban for European banks outside of Russia to use SPFS. The new package also set conditions for creating a list of third-country banks connected to this system. These banks were then prohibited from conducting transactions with EU residents. Thus, the EU effectively introduced a mechanism for applying secondary sanctions for using SPFS. On October 11, 2024, the NAU sent a letter to Klaus Vedder , the head of the Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and the Capital Markets Union (FISMA) of the European Commission, with information on Belarusian banks connected to SPFS and suspected of evading sanctions. The 16th sanctions package against Russia, adopted today, further tightened restrictions in the financial sector. In particular, the EU has, for the first time, imposed a ban on transactions involving specific credit or financial institutions established outside Russia that use SPFS. Specifically, three banks fell under secondary EU sanctions for using the Russian equivalent of SWIFT to circumvent EU sanctions. Two of these organizations were registered in Belarus and connected to SPFS, using it to bypass EU restrictive measures . It is worth recalling that by the end of 2021, almost all Belarusian banks were connected to SPFS. On December 9, 2021, the Central Bank of Russia announced that 23 Belarusian banks (including the Development Bank), as well as the National Bank, the Belarusian Currency and Stock Exchange, and the Belarusian Interbank Settlement Center, were included in the list of those connected to the system.

Muammar Gaddafi with Alexander Lukashenko during his visit to Minsk in 2008. Is it true that instead of weakening, Lukashenko may face new U.S. sanctions? What role could Belarus play in military conflicts in Africa? And why is this a troubling signal for the Belarusians themselves? Belarus is increasingly sinking into the shadowy world of military dictators and isolated regimes. While other countries build dialogue with developed powers, Lukashenko opens doors to leaders of dubious military factions. The recent visit of Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army, is a striking example of how Lukashenko’s regime is balancing on the brink of an international scandal. Khalifa Belkassem Haftar is a Libyan military figure. He was appointed Marshal (2016) and Supreme Commander of the Libyan National Army by the Libyan House of Representatives. Haftar — a Libyan military leader who started with Muammar Gaddafi, was his close ally but betrayed him during the revolution and sided with the rebels.  Now Haftar is one of the leaders of a military faction involved in the ongoing civil war in Libya and claims authority in the African country. Media outlets associated with Lukashenko’s regime reported that the talks focused on “humanitarian, social, and economic cooperation.” However, the participants of the meeting, namely the head of the KGB Ivan Tertel and Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin, suggest that other topics were likely discussed. Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin and KGB chief Ivan Tertel This is confirmed by Libyan sources. According to them, the purpose of the visit was to strengthen the air force of Haftar's army, including technical maintenance and modernization of Russian MiG-29 fighter jets . In addition to spare parts supply, discussions also involved the training of Libyan pilots and cybersecurity development. Why is Lukashenko reaching out to a leader of a country torn apart by civil war? And why is Lukashenko establishing contacts with one of the participants in the civil war in Libya? Belarus has found itself in deep international isolation due to the actions of dictator Lukashenko and his domestic repressive policies. In such conditions, the regime is forced to seek partners among countries that are also in conflict with the West or undergoing internal crises. Libya is one such example. But it is important to understand that Libya today is not a unified state, but a fractured country, where different factions are fighting for power. Haftar is the leader of only one of these factions, not the entire Libya. In fact, his meeting with Lukashenko is an interaction not with a state, but with a military faction. One of the main goals of the negotiations was military cooperation. Belarus, having a developed defense industry, could sell weapons, military equipment, or offer repair and modernization services to Libya. Additionally, Belarus could act as an intermediary for Russia in arms supplies to Libya. Moscow had previously used a Syrian military base for such purposes, but with its weakened position in the region, this route has been under threat. Belarus, having established schemes to bypass sanctions, could take over part of these supplies. What does this mean for the Belarusians? The benefits of such cooperation for Lukashenko’s regime are clear: money, political support from Russia, and the appearance of international contacts. But for ordinary Belarusians, it means added risks: Growing International Isolation: In recent months, Belarusian diplomats have been in contact with representatives of countries in crisis — North Korea, Myanmar, Afghanistan, Syria, Lebanon. This shows that Lukashenko is taking Belarus deeper into the club of isolated regimes. Cooperation with dubious military leaders involved in civil wars further undermines Belarus’ reputation on the international stage. Conclusion: Playing with Fire, Dragging Belarusians In The meeting between the head of the KGB Ivan Tertel and Khalifa Haftar. Khalifa Haftar’s visit to Minsk  is not just a diplomatic meeting. It’s another step by Lukashenko toward shadow deals, armed conflicts, and authoritarian regimes where violence and chaos prevail. In the context of international isolation, the regime is not seeking partners who can bring real economic benefits to Belarus, but instead is focusing on cooperation with dictatorships, military factions, and countries engulfed in civil war. The main problem is that such contacts offer nothing good for the Belarusians. Lukashenko is not developing trade with successful states, not attracting investments, not opening new markets for Belarusian goods. Instead, he is dragging the country into dangerous schemes that could lead to tougher sanctions, new economic losses, and even greater disdain on the world stage. And there are grounds for this.  Specifically, the  Libya Stabilisation Act  provides for the possibility of imposing sanctions on foreign organizations supporting warring Libyan factions . That means any Belarusian company could face blocking U.S. sanctions for assisting the faction led by Haftar. Or is Lukashenko hoping that the U.S. won’t notice? He’s wrong to hope. U.S. Congressman Joe Wilson from the ruling Republican Party stated that he urges Libyan military commander Khalifa Haftar not to make a big mistake by allowing the expansion of Russian presence in Libya. Remember, Congressman Wilson is one of the legislators behind the development and adoption of the Libya Stabilization Act. By the way, immediately after his visit to Minsk, Haftar rejected the reconciliation plan for Libya signed at a meeting during the African Union summit. But back to Lukashenko. The most important thing is that he is taking these dubious steps not for the country, but for himself. Lukashenko no longer sees Belarus as a state with independent interests. All his actions are aimed solely at preserving his own power and gaining personal benefits. Weapons sales, military contracts, deals with dubious regimes — all of this helps him maintain control, fill the budget of the security forces, and ensure loyalty from his entourage. At the same time, the real problems of Belarusians — falling incomes, plant closures, outflow of specialists, and economic crisis — do not concern him. While the country sinks into poverty, Lukashenko is establishing ties with people for whom war is business. And the longer this course continues, the more Belarus slips into the status of an outcast on the world stage. Each such visit is another step toward turning the country into a tool for the dictator's personal ambitions. Belarusians remain the hostages of this game, left only to watch as their future is sold behind the scenes of military deals.

Who secured the dictator Lukashenko’s seventh term? Who did Lukashenko thank for his reappointment? Who signed the country's sentence for another five years? Who gets paid for selling the future of their country, the future of Belarusians? The team of the National Anti-Crisis Management (NAM) continues its work on forming sanctions proposals. The dossiers prepared by the National Anti-Crisis Management are meticulously collected materials that substantiate the need for imposing sanctions on individuals who have committed illegal actions. These dossiers are not just justifications for sanctions but also materials that will serve as the foundation for future criminal cases. We have already submitted these proposals, and a decision will be made soon. So, here are the specific names in this material from the NAM. Pavel Pavlovich Latushka:  Deputy head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, representative of the UTC on power transition. Head of the People’s Anti-Crisis Management, Leader of the faction "Team Latushka and the Movement 'For Freedom'" in the Coordination Council of the third convocation. Terror, atrocities, mass repressions — these are all associated with Lukashenko's regime today. And there are people who signed to ensure that this continues for the next five years. These are the employees of the so-called Central Election Commission (CEC) — an organization specializing in election falsification in Belarus. People who turn elections into a tragic circus. Do people buy tickets for the circus? We will offer them tickets to the sanctions world for the circus they have organized. The main impression — don't travel abroad. And the key adventure — potential criminal cases in New Belarus. Igor Sigov:  actor from the Kupala Theater, member of the "Team Latushka and the Movement 'For Freedom'" faction in the Coordination Council. Even before the so-called election campaign in Belarus, the process was called a farce by representatives of many civilized countries. This conclusion was based on concrete facts: the presence of thousands of political prisoners, including former presidential candidates; mass persecution of the population for political reasons; forced deportation of dissidents — these facts allowed for the conclusion that holding full-fledged presidential elections in Belarus was impossible. Furthermore, violations of voting rights and mass falsifications are criminal offenses. Offenses that are punishable even by current legislation. Behind the commission of these crimes in 2025 are specific perpetrators, members of the Central Election Commission. We know about these people. And fragments from the existing dossiers on the new figures involved in our sanctions proposals will be discussed in today’s video. Press conference of the CEC, January 27, 2025. Source: belta.by So, who and how gets into the composition of the CEC members? What loyalty tests do these figures undergo: preliminary eavesdropping, perhaps even polygraphs? What achievements can get someone into the CEC? And who is currently a candidate for inclusion in the EU sanctions lists, which are being formed, including based on the proposals from the National Anti-Crisis Management? Denis Vladimirovich Duk Member of the CEC. Rector of Mogilev State University named after Arkady Kuleshov Denis Vladimirovich Duk was born in Novopolotsk. He studied well, graduated from Polotsk University, and later entered the postgraduate program at the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus. In 2004, he defended his candidate dissertation, and the following year, he became the head of the department at his alma mater. In 2011, at the age of 34, Duk defended his doctoral dissertation. A great career for the benefit of science. Since 2013, Duk has been the vice-rector for academic work at his university, and in 2017, at the age of 40, he became the rector of Mogilev University — the same university where dictator Lukashenko once studied. This seemed like the pinnacle of a career. In his pocket — an honorary certificate from the Ministry of Education, a prize from the Academy of Sciences, and the Francisk Skaryna Medal. However, everything changed in 2020, when Denis Vladimirovich faced a moral choice. Duk chose the criminal path: the path of politically motivated repression, pressure, and persecution of dissidents. Duk took responsibility for destroying the careers of students and fellow professors. He personally summoned university staff he considered unreliable and threatened them with career ruin. According to the "Honest People" initiative, at least two students were expelled from Mogilev State University, three underwent so-called preventive talks, and four professors lost their jobs. One of the university staff — a department head, a candidate of biological sciences — was sent to prison on politically motivated charges. On May 31, 2021, an attestation commission completed its work at Mogilev State University named after Arkady Kuleshov. As a result, some staff members were dismissed by the rector's order. In particular, a colleague of Duk’s, a historian who had worked at the university since 1991, was fired, as well as a professor from the natural sciences department who had been at the university since 1993 — a person considered the best geographer in the city. Another professor, an associate professor of literature and intercultural communications, who had worked at the university for twenty-one years, was also forced to leave. For his loyalty and devotion, Duk was appointed a member of the CEC in 2021. In 2024, already among the falsifiers, Duk gave a monologue to the students of Mogilev University, threatening them with criminal prosecution. Alexander Genadievich Tkachev Member of the CEC. Deputy General Director for Security, Regime, and Personnel at the production association "Belorusneft". Tkachev was born in Zhlobin. He comes from the security forces. He started his career in the Department of Internal Affairs of the Zhlobin District Executive Committee, then worked in the KGB of Gomel Region and as deputy head of the Department for Personnel, Ideology, and Organizational Work at the Institute of National Security of Belarus — the main training ground for KGB cadres. From there, Tkachev moved to the Gomel District Executive Committee, where he became head of affairs, and in 2018, he became chairman of the district council of deputies. According to the publication "Flagstok", after Tkachev was elected to the council, an investigation was initiated against his former boss — head of the district executive committee Alexander Sitnitsa. After the trial and a ten-year sentence, Tkachev moved to the Ministry of Justice. In September 2021, Tkachev joined "Belorusneft", leaving  his previous position as head of the Department in the Gomel Regional Executive Committee. He started  by visiting the subsidiaries of "Belorusneft" and questioning employees about their attitude towards the authorities and about arrests during protests. It was during this period that more dismissals took place. As a result, in December 2021, the production association "Belorusneft" was included in the EU and US sanctions against Belarus due to repression against the company’s employees, an area for which Tkachev was responsible. Alexander Vladimirovich Yuzhik Member of the CEC. First Deputy Head of the Main Department of Justice of the Grodno Regional Executive Committee. Alexander Yuzhik was born in 1975. In 1996, he graduated from the law faculty of Grodno State University and began working in the prosecutor's office. It was prosecutor Yuzhik in 2011 who requested the sentence for journalist Andrzej Poczobut to serve three years in a general regime colony. Yuzhik considered Poczobut’s statements about Lukashenko to be libel. He also played a role in politically motivated cases targeting artists and activists. In December 2021, he was appointed to the CEC. Five out of 12 CEC members are already under EU sanctions: Igor Vasilievich Karpenko (Chairman of the CEC) Andrei Anatolievich Gurzhiy Olga Leonidovna Dorochenko Sergey Alekseyevich Kalinovsky Alexander Mikhailovich Losyakin The other members of the CEC are also included in our recent sanctions proposals: Denis Vladimirovich Duk Alexander Genadievich Tkachev Alexander Vladimirovich Yuzhik Alexey Vladimirovich Bashan Elena Anatolievna Baldovskaya Elena Konstantinovna Kuntsevich Ekaterina Alexandrovna Fedosenko As members of the CEC, all of these people are responsible for illegal actions during the so-called 2025 presidential elections, for failing to meet international standards, and for falsifying election results. In simple terms, they are responsible for the continuation of Lukashenko’s reign of terror over Belarus for the next five years. They are the ones Lukashenko entrusted with conducting his reappointment. Their actions confirm that the elections in Belarus cannot be considered honest, free, or fair. By studying their biographies, one can ask rhetorical questions: Can people involved in politically motivated persecution coordinate a legitimate electoral process? Can people involved in repression uphold the free will of the people? The answer to these questions is obvious — no. And these figures in the new sanctions proposals demonstrate what the so-called Central Election Commission represents today. These people took responsibility for sentencing our country to another five years of darkness under dictatorship. They make a circus out of the election process, which should be the cornerstone of the country’s political life. But they will not escape responsibility. Artem Bruhan:  Deputy Head of the NAU, Analyst The team of the NAM continues its work. Today, these people are in our sanctions dossiers. They won’t be able to spend the money they’ve earned selling the future of our country on resorts, travels, and comfortable vacations in Europe. But that’s not the most important thing. The most important thing is that the materials in these dossiers will eventually serve as the basis for criminal cases. The members of the CEC — figures in the NAU’s sanctions proposals — should remember: accountability is inevitable.

Full text of the interview for Deutsche Welle with the lawyer from the National Anti-Crisis Management (NAM) Article published on Deutsche Welle  on February 14, 2025 Is there a chance for a trial against Lukashenko at The Hague? At this point, it is more realistic to assume that certain international criminal procedural actions will be taken against the highest military-political leadership of Belarus, rather than a full trial. To answer this question more thoroughly, it would be helpful to first explain how the process works in the International Criminal Court (ICC), which differs significantly from national criminal justice systems. The entire process in the ICC can be divided into six stages, only two of which can be fully or partially carried out in the absence of the accused — the preliminary examination and the investigation. However, except for the arrest warrant procedure, both stages are not judicial processes regarding a specific individual. Given the lack of tools to physically arrest Belarusian authorities, the issuance of an arrest warrant currently seems to be the final procedure. How realistic is the issuance of an arrest warrant against Belarusian officials and for what crimes? Today, the Office of the Prosecutor is working in two directions, investigating crimes potentially committed by the highest military-political leadership of Belarus. These are the investigation of the "Ukrainian situatio" and the preliminary examination of the "Belarusian situation". In the first case, the facts related to the illegal relocation of civilians (children) from Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories to Belarus are being considered. In the second, the circumstances surrounding crimes against humanity committed against part of the Belarusian civilian population are under review. Each of these two tracks theoretically could lead to arrest warrants. The procedure for issuing an arrest warrant takes place only during the investigation stage. For this to happen, the Office of the Prosecutor must conclude that certain criteria are met, proving there is sufficient reason to believe that the individual in question committed crimes within the context of the ongoing investigation. The Office of the Prosecutor then submits a request to the Pre-Trial Chamber asking for an arrest warrant to be issued. It is important to highlight a common misconception: The Office of the Prosecutor does not issue arrest warrants for the ICC. Only the Pre-Trial Chamber, the judges of the ICC, can do so. From the outside, it may seem that an arrest warrant for the "Ukrainian situation" is more realistic since the "Belarusian situation" is still only at the preliminary examination stage. However, certain factors influencing the Office of the Prosecutor’s work suggest that the result may be faster in the latter case. What factors influence this? A key factor affecting the Office of the Prosecutor’s ability to prove that a crime was committed by a specific individual, and for the Pre-Trial Chamber to confirm that conclusion, is the availability of information and evidence, including those directly obtained from victims. In this regard, the mechanisms for transferring such information by states, non-governmental organizations, victims, and witnesses, outlined in the Rome Statute, are especially important. Practice shows these mechanisms are most effective when the Office of the Prosecutor is already conducting a preliminary examination or investigation. One such mechanism is the ability to submit communications under Article 15 of the Rome Statute. Taking advantage of the ongoing investigation of the "Ukrainian situation" the National Anti-Crisis Management (NAM) transferred collected information about the illegal relocation of Ukrainian minors from Russian-occupied territories to Belarus in June and November of 2023. It is important to note that NAM directly delivered this information to representatives of the Office of the Prosecutor. Communication is conducted directly. At this stage, it would be inappropriate to speculate on whether the materials submitted are sufficient for the Office of the Prosecutor to conclude that an arrest warrant could be requested. The uniqueness of the situation is that the transmitted information primarily concerned orphans located in occupied territories or Russia, and there is no possibility to receive direct testimony from them about the circumstances of their relocation and stay in Belarus. On the other hand, there is a vast amount of information about alleged crimes against humanity of an extraterritorial nature committed against part of the Belarusian civilian population. The majority of collected evidence comes directly from victims of these crimes. Until recently, transferring this information to the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC seemed fruitless since no preliminary examination of the "Belarusian situation" had even been initiated. Simply put, there was no criminal process in place where such information could be applied — this possibility only emerged after the Lithuanian government referred the "Belarusian situation" to the ICC. How can a preliminary examination or investigation be initiated by the Office of the Prosecutor? There are three ways to start a preliminary examination: If a state party to the Rome Statute refers a situation to the Office of the Prosecutor. If the situation is referred to the Office of the Prosecutor by the UN Security Council. The Office of the Prosecutor can initiate an investigation on its own. The key difference between the first two methods and the third is that, in addition to the Office of the Prosecutor independently collecting all the information, it also needs the approval of the Pre-Trial Chamber to move forward with the investigation. In the case of the "Belarusian situation", the third method is not only procedurally the most complex but also politically unrealistic, since it would require the Office of the Prosecutor to deal with crimes largely committed outside of the state's party to the Rome Statute. In such circumstances, NAM and partner organizations made every effort to convince one of the states party to the Rome Statute to refer the "Belarusian situation" to the Office of the Prosecutor under Article 14 of the Rome Statute. The Ministry of Justice of Lithuania responded to this request. On September 30, 2024, the Lithuanian government referred the "Belarusian situation" to the Office of the Prosecutor, thereby removing a number of barriers that had previously made any criminal process in the ICC regarding crimes committed specifically against Belarusian civilians impossible. What comes next? The Office of the Prosecutor has now started the preliminary examination of the "Belarusian situation". If a positive decision is made, the Office of the Prosecutor can initiate an investigation into the "Belarusian situation", during which separate cases will be formed against specific alleged criminals. If a decision is made to proceed with the investigation of the "Belarusian situation", the available information suggests that the issuance of an arrest warrant against the highest military-political leadership of Belarus is only a matter of time. How soon can the Office of the Prosecutor make a decision on starting the investigation? There are no strict deadlines, but practice shows that such a decision could be made by summer of this year. What specific crimes are being investigated in the “Belarusian situation”? This does not concern all acts of violence that have taken place since 2020. It is important to prove not just the fact of violence but that the context of this violence fits the criteria for crimes against humanity and that these crimes fall under the territorial jurisdiction of the ICC. Today, it seems possible to speak only about two types of crimes: deportation and persecution for political reasons as crimes against humanity, which were partially committed on the territory of states parties to the Rome Statute. The number of victims of deportation is currently estimated to be at least 300,000. The victims of the second crime are those who have faced threats of violence, criminal prosecution in absentia, and similar acts abroad while on the territory of states parties to the Rome Statute.

The visit of the Belarusian delegation to the occupied Melitopol on February 10, which was organized with the support of Russia’s occupying authorities, raises serious concerns. Representatives of Lukashenko's regime, such as member of the House of Representatives of the National Assembly of Belarus Vadim Gigin, leader of the “Union Movement” Sergey Lush, and member of the higher political council of the "White Russia" party Grigory Azarenok, visited the Zaporizhzhia region to discuss cooperation with local businesses, supporting the Russian regime on Ukrainian territory. This event could mark a significant step that will impact not only Belarus's international reputation but also the position of Belarusian businesses that choose to engage in such cooperation. Sergey Lush, Vadim Gigin, and Grigory Azarenok in the Russian-occupied Ukrainian Melitopol on February 10, 2025. Photo: Telegram channel of pro-Russian collaborator Yevgeny Balitsky – the Russian-appointed governor of the occupied part of the Zaporizhzhia region. Source: news.zerkalo.io What risks are there for Belarusian companies? The visit to Melitopol is a direct violation of international norms and laws, as the occupation of Ukrainian territory is illegal under international law. By participating in such a visit, Belarusian representatives essentially become accomplices in this aggression, supporting Russia's actions that violate Ukraine's territorial integrity. For Belarusian businesses, this is associated with a number of serious risks. Firstly, participation in cooperation with occupied territories automatically casts doubt on the legitimacy of such enterprises on the international stage. Many countries, including those in the EU and NATO, may impose sanctions on Belarusian companies involved in such operations. This will lead to blocked financial flows, sanctions on supplies, and losses in foreign markets. The impact of these sanctions will be especially severe for export-oriented companies and those working with foreign partners. The Belarusian authorities are playing a strange game As for the illegitimate Belarusian authorities, their actions are becoming increasingly suspicious. Lukashenko’s regime, aiming to solidify its dependence on Russia, is actively involving Belarusian businesses in cooperation with illegal structures in the occupied territories of Ukraine. This risks further deteriorating the situation for entrepreneurs and the economic stability of the country as a whole. Belarus has long been under international sanctions, and these sanctions will continue to tighten if Lukashenko does not stop supporting Russia's aggression. But now, with such open cooperation with the occupation authorities, the reputational losses for Belarus may become inevitable. And worst of all, Belarusian companies involved in such deals risk being isolated internationally and found among those directly supporting the occupation and war. Risks for entrepreneurs: from sanctions to reputational losses For Belarusian entrepreneurs who may get involved in this process, the consequences could be catastrophic. In addition to sanctions, companies may face legal consequences on the international level. Furthermore, participation in these processes creates significant reputational risks for Belarusian businesses. International companies and partners from the EU, the US, or Ukraine may refuse to cooperate with those who have sided with the aggressor. Reputation will be destroyed, and it will be extremely difficult to restore it. Lukashenko Puts Belarusian Business at Risk It is impossible to ignore that Lukashenko’s actions are aimed at maintaining power and dependency on the Kremlin, but in doing so, he is paying the price not only with international reputation but also with the stability of the economy. By pushing Belarusian enterprises into cooperation with the occupied territories, Lukashenko is aware that many of them will fall under sanctions and international condemnation. He is willing to take such steps despite the obvious economic risks, just to maintain his power and continue supporting Putin's actions. What should businesses do? Belarusian entrepreneurs must understand that cooperating with the occupied regions of Ukraine not only violates international norms but also puts their business at risk. Choosing to cooperate in such a manner is a decision to pursue short-term benefits that may turn into long-term losses. Businesses must remain committed to legal norms, avoiding involvement in illegal and dangerous schemes led by Lukashenko's regime. Only this way can one preserve reputation and ensure long-term stability.

In January 2025, the Agreement between the Government of Lukashenko and the Government of the Russian Federation on the mutual recognition of visas and other matters related to the entry of foreign nationals and stateless persons into the territories of the states — participants in the Treaty on the Creation of the Union State of Belarus and Russia came into force. Articles 2-5 of the agreement contain key provisions that establish mutual obligations between Belarus and Russia, directly change the migration procedures of both countries and potentially posing additional risks for the neighboring EU countries in the current context of the migration crisis at the EU-Belarus border. In particular, according to the provisions of Article 2 of the Agreement, foreign nationals who have received any entry visa to the Russian Federation are allowed to transit through or stay in the Republic of Belarus. By implementing such measures, Lukashenko's regime effectively loses the ability to exercise primary control over the entry of foreigners through the consular service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What risks arise with the entry into force of the Agreement on the mutual recognition of Belarusian and Russian visas? The Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet and Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Pavel Latushka, noted: "The main difference between the new migration regime and the previous one is the ability for foreign nationals to enter Belarus on the basis of Russian visas, legally. In such conditions, potential illegal migrants planning to cross the Belarus-EU border can stay in Belarus legally until the potential moment of illegal border crossing between Belarus and the EU. In fact, the entry process for such individuals into Belarus is simplified, and part of Belarus's sovereign rights regarding the granting of entry to foreigners is transferred to the Russian Federation. In this way, the Russian side gains additional opportunities for direct influence on the flow of illegal migration from Belarus to EU countries."

During the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe session, where the delegation of the Coordination Council of Belarus participated for the first time in history, a resolution titled "Urgent Need for Free and Fair Elections in Belarus" was unanimously adopted. Delegates from the faction "Latushka Team and Movement for Freedom" proposed two significant amendments to the resolution. First of all, the resolution clearly emphasizes the non-recognition of the farce organized by Lukashenko under the guise of elections, and the Assembly stresses the lack of grounds to recognize Lukashenko’s legitimacy. The resolution text states:  "In a context where freedoms of speech, assembly, and association are restricted; opposition political parties are dissolved, and their leaders persecuted; media freedom is not upheld; there are no mechanisms to challenge these violations, and independent national and international election observation is not permitted — it is evident that free and fair elections are impossible."  "The Assembly calls on the member states of the Council of Europe to reject the legitimacy of the so-called elections in Belarus on January 26, 2025, to clearly declare the non-recognition of the election of Alexander Lukashenko as President of Belarus, and to take decisive steps to expand and strengthen targeted sanctions against the regime and those supporting its illegal activities" .  "We believe that there are no grounds to recognize the legitimacy of Alexander Lukashenko as President." The resolution particularly emphasizes the importance of ending repression and releasing political prisoners:  "The Assembly calls for the cessation of all repressive measures aimed at suppressing dissent, ensuring the unconditional and immediate release of all political prisoners, and their rehabilitation. It calls for amnesty for all those arrested for political reasons". The "Latushka Team and Movement for Freedom" faction proposed two amendments to the resolution, addressing support for institutions alternative to Lukashenko's regime and bringing Lukashenko to justice.   The first : "The Assembly once again reaffirms its strong commitment to supporting the rights, freedoms, and security of the Belarusian people, expressing solidarity with all those who have suffered from the crimes of Lukashenko's regime. It also reaffirms its support for the Belarusian democratic forces led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and their structures — the Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the United Transitional Cabinet, and the Coordination Council as the elected representative body of Belarusian democratic society, which are leading efforts to build a democratic future for Belarus."  The second : "To promote justice and accountability for crimes against humanity committed against Belarusians by the highest military-political leadership of Belarus. To support the referral of the situation in Belarus by the Lithuanian government to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court". "The Latushka Team and Movement for Freedom is systematically working to implement the program presented during the elections to the Coordination Council — to achieve the prosecution of Lukashenko for crimes against the Belarusian people", — emphasized the leader of the faction "Latushka Team and Movement for Freedom" stated Pavel Latushka.

This week, the delegation of the Coordination Council of Belarus is taking part in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe session. The main task during the first days is to establish bilateral cooperation with all political groups of PACE. The delegates have already held meetings with the SOC  – Socialists, Democrats, and Greens, EPP/CD  – the European People's Party group, EC/DA  – the European Conservatives and Democratic Alliance group, ALDE  – the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, and UEL  – the United European Left group. During these meetings, the Speaker of the Coordination Council and member of the “Latushka Team and Movement for Freedom” faction, Anzhalika Melnikava , emphasized the importance of democratic change in Belarus to ensure true regional security and achieve peace in the region. The Speaker also noted that the Coordination Council, as the representative body of democratic forces and civil society, will support the work of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in achieving this goal, using the tools available to PACE. The leader of the “Latushka Team and Movement for Freedom” faction, Pavel Latushka , during his presentation, focused on the priority issue – assisting the member states of the Council of Europe and their parliaments in bringing Lukashenko to justice through the mechanisms of the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity committed by Lukashenko against the Belarusian people. Also participating in the PACE session are delegation head Aleksandra Mamaeva  ("European Choice"), Margaryta Vorykhava  ("Youth Advance"), Valer Matskevich  ("European Choice"), and Pavel Terashkovich  ("Our Case / Belarusian Christian Democrats").