How Lukashenko's regime might introduce the Russian ruble in Belarus
On March 10, Lukashenko gathered his close associates to shift the burden of power onto new shoulders. In front of the cameras, he called Roman Golovchenko, his former prime minister, "a man who has sat on the hot skillet for too long" and appointed him to head the National Bank. Alexander Turchin, an administrator from the Minsk region whose career is built on loyalty to the regime, replaced him as prime minister.
Lukashenko has ruled Belarus since 1994, and over the three decades of his leadership, his style of governance has become predictable: keeping everyone in suspense, swapping loyal officials, and suppressing any signs of independence. The appointments made on March 10 are no exception. Roman Golovchenko became the head of the National Bank, while Alexander Turchin, previously leading the Minsk region, took the position of prime minister.
Both are graduates of the Academy of Management under Lukashenko, both are economists by education, and both are products of a system where loyalty to Lukashenko is valued more than competence. Lukashenko himself emphasized this, stating that the new government has "many economists", and that Golovchenko "has learned more about the economy from life than anyone else". But behind these words lies not care for the country, but calculation: in the crisis situation, the dictator needs people who will follow his will, not look for a way out of the impasse.
Lukashenko uses appointments as a tool of control and intimidation. By moving Golovchenko to the National Bank, he doesn't let him "rest," as he put it, but assigns him a new task: to bring the banking system under his interests. Turchin is tasked with "turning the economy upside down" — a phrase that means distorting meaning. This is not a slip of the tongue, but a symbol: Lukashenko is not looking for reforms; he wants to maintain the illusion of stability.
For the other officials, this is a signal: no one is safe. The reshuffles remind them that their positions are shaky, and loyalty is the only ticket to survival. But this also creates hidden discontent: every new "economist" in the government is a potential competitor, and every order from Lukashenko is another nail in the coffin of their autonomy.
The economy of Belarus in 2025 is a minefield: thousands of Belarusian specialists left the country in 2024, and this process continues, while inflation is accelerating, fueling the people's fatigue. Lukashenko is counting on new faces to pull his regime out of the abyss, but he doesn't realize that he is pushing the country into an even deeper deadlock, where there is almost no way out.
At the same time, Russia has never abandoned its plan, at the final stage of integration, to switch Belarus to the Russian ruble, as outlined in the agreement on the formation of the so-called Union State. The share of national currencies in settlements between Belarus and Russia has already reached 98%. It is clear that settlements are primarily made in Russian rubles, not Belarusian ones.
It is likely that Golovchenko and Turchin will be the ones to implement the Kremlin's dream of a common currency. Under pressure from Moscow and amid economic dependence on Russia, they will probably promote this project, despite the loss of Belarus's financial sovereignty.
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