The Treaty between the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation on Security Guarantees within the Union State was signed in Minsk on December 6, 2024, by Putin and Lukashenko and was ratified almost simultaneously by the parliaments of both Belarus and Russia on February 26, 2025.
The Union agreements oblige Minsk to coordinate its foreign and defense policies with Russia. The signed treaty on security guarantees formalizes mutual defense obligations but, de facto, grants Moscow the right to intervene if the regime in Belarus is under threat.
A closer analysis of this treaty reveals its significant implications:
Article 2, Paragraph 1, establishes the integrity of the defense space of the Union State, effectively reducing Belarus’ military sovereignty to a minimum and integrating it as an element in the realization of Russia’s geopolitical military objectives.
Article 2, Paragraph 2, states that "the parties undertake... to take appropriate actions in the political, military, and other spheres in cases of encroachments on the security of either party or the Union State as a whole". Such encroachments include "the creation or implementation of a threat to the sovereignty, independence, and/or constitutional order of the Parties", and those responsible for such threats include terrorist and extremist organizations and groups. Given the regime’s broad interpretation of any political, social, or informational activity that does not align with its policies as extremist, this clause effectively allows Russia to interfere in Belarus’ domestic political affairs. As a result, Belarus risks losing control even over internal aspects of its national security.
Article 4, Paragraph 2, lays the groundwork for justifying aggressive actions against other states. It states that "in the event of an act of aggression... against one of the Parties or an imminent threat thereof, the other Party guarantees... the immediate provision of necessary military, military-technical, and other assistance, upon agreement between the heads of state and following an official request from the affected Party". The full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2024 was justified on the grounds of an alleged imminent threat from Ukraine. A similar scenario could now be repeated, potentially not only against Ukraine but also against EU and NATO member states.
A key article in terms of creating threats to Belarus’ and Russia’s neighbors is Article 5, which states that "in accordance with separate agreements... military and other facilities of the Russian Federation may be established on the territory of the Republic of Belarus, and Russian military formations may also be deployed there". This means that Russia can ensure a unilateral and extensive (without reciprocal obligations from Russia) military presence in Belarus on a permanent basis, effectively establishing a western front along Belarus’ borders with the EU and Ukraine. For example, after the "Zapad-2025" exercises, part of the Russian armed forces could remain in Belarus under the provisions of Articles 5 and/or 4 of the treaty.
Article 6 addresses the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons, including those deployed on Belarusian territory. Paragraph 2 states that "nuclear weapons of the Russian Federation may be used in response to the use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction against either Party, as well as in the event of aggression against either Party with conventional weapons that create a critical threat to its sovereignty or territorial integrity". Russian tactical nuclear warheads are already stationed in Belarus by mutual agreement, and in the future, Moscow could increase their number or deploy new delivery systems (for example, the "Oreshnik" missile complexes that Lukashenko has publicly requested). Russia’s updated nuclear doctrine has already extended the "nuclear umbrella" to Belarus, equating an attack on Belarus to an attack on Russia with the possibility of a retaliatory nuclear strike. Thus, this treaty aligns with Russia’s revised nuclear doctrine. The provisions of this article potentially create the risk of a retaliatory nuclear strike against Belarusian territory.
It is important to note that Article 7 pays special attention to one of the most effective non-military measures against dictators and aggressors—sanctions. The treaty states that "any Party may initiate the consideration of collective countermeasures against such restrictive measures, including mutual support in implementing state economic policies..." This suggests that Lukashenko may once again seek additional resources from the Kremlin, citing sanctions pressure and the provisions of this treaty.
Conclusion
The military-political integration of Belarus and Russia has fundamentally changed the regional security landscape. Belarus, once a relatively neutral neighbor to Europe, has become an accomplice in Russia’s military policies, contributing to regional instability. Its participation in the aggression against Ukraine serves as a clear example. Strengthening military ties with Moscow has provided Lukashenko’s regime with security guarantees on Kremlin’s terms, but in return, Belarus has become even more dependent on assisting Russia in achieving its geopolitical objectives. The country’s military sovereignty has significantly weakened to the point where Belarus can no longer conduct an independent foreign and defense policy.
Russia’s military border has effectively moved closer to NATO’s borders. The military-political integration of Russia and Belarus has led to the creation of a unified defense architecture covering much of Eastern Europe, increasing potential threats to NATO and exacerbating tensions around Ukraine. The continuation of this course risks further escalation — from the deployment of new weapons systems (including nuclear) to the possible complete loss of Belarus’ sovereignty. This is an extremely concerning trend for regional stability. The international community, including European states, will have to contend with a new level of military cohesion between Belarus and Russia, necessitating the development of measures to prevent further potential acts of aggression.
In this context, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s statement at the Munich Security Conference about the need to establish a security line in Europe, including along Belarus’ eastern border, is particularly significant.
It is crucial for the EU and Belarus’ neighboring countries to develop a strategy aimed at supporting anti-war sentiment within Belarusian society and fostering its democratic aspirations.
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