Key points from the speech by the Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Pavel Latushka, at the joint session of the EU Affairs Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Polish Sejm
January 8, 2025
Dear Madam President-elect, Dear Chairpersons, Dear Deputies and Senators, Dear Colleagues,
It is crucial for us that one of the declared priority tasks during Poland's presidency of the European Union is the situation in Belarus. Poland is a strategic partner of the democratic forces of Belarus and the Belarusian society.
In the interests of the majority of Belarusians is a democratic, independent, and sovereign Belarus, which, I am convinced, also corresponds to the national interests of Poland, neighboring Belarus. Our common strategy, emphasizing the importance of democratic changes in Belarus, can be based on this convergence of interests.
Achieving this goal is possible with systematic support from civil society and a clear signal to Lukashenko that no one will cooperate with him, and he will not be able to repeat another cycle for the sixth time — a unique circle of deceiving Belarusians and European partners.
The motto of Poland's EU presidency will be Security.
What position does Belarus occupy in this context today? Indeed, the democratization of Belarus is the most effective solution for our country to stop being a source of threats currently emanating from Lukashenko's pro-Russian dictatorship.
It is important to say that increasing billion-dollar expenditures, expenses on strengthening the border with Belarus — this is undoubtedly necessary, but at the same time, it deals with the consequence. In modern conditions, these actions are undoubtedly necessary, but at the same time, it is important not to forget about the cause. As long as the cause is not eliminated, the problem will not be solved, and defense-military expenditures will continue to increase.
Creating a conditional "moat with crocodiles" on the border with Belarus is a tactical decision to strengthen security, but strategically it does not relieve tension, the threat remains. Peace and Ukraine's victory, for which we all fight, do not fully reduce the strategic threats for Poland. The strategic solution involves taking measures aimed at detaching Belarus from Russia, democratizing, and integrating Belarusian society into Europe. And this is not possible without changing the political situation inside Belarus—that is, without abolishing Lukashenko's pro-Russian regime.
Indeed, at the moment, there are not so many tools for direct action. However, Poland and Europe still have tools, the application of which would create conditions that directly affect the possibility of changing the situation in Belarus. And accordingly — change the security situation in the region.
It is important when making strategic decisions to realize the following:
Lukashenko will not change the domestic policy in Belarus.
Lukashenko is unable to pull Belarus out of Putin's embrace.
Lukashenko will not become independent in foreign policy.
We are on the eve of the so-called elections that Lukashenko plans to organize. But we can only call this process a farce. And this farce cannot be the basis for revising the policy towards Lukashenko. Lately, we have heard individual voices about the need to establish communication with both Lukashenko himself and representatives of his regime. But here I would like to note the basic positions when considering these issues.
First, a few facts about what is happening in Belarus.
Despite the release of some political prisoners at the end of their term and under so-called amnesty, their number remains consistently high — 1,300 political prisoners. And repression is only intensifying.
Does this look like the regime has changed its policy for democratic countries to recognize it as a partner? Should the democratic world really start a dialogue with Lukashenko, knowing what is a condition for starting a dialogue — he has been in power for 30 years and has gone through 5 such cycles.
Perhaps pragmatists will say that repression is not terrible, the main thing is that Lukashenko will try to distance himself from Russia.
He will not try and he will not be able to.
Belarus today is a military platform that can be used by Russia at any moment for the next phase of aggression. Before the New Year, Lukashenko transferred several additional military units close to the border with Ukraine.
Lukashenko is unable to pull Belarus out of Putin's embrace and will ensure Russia's military-political interests, which guarantees him the retention of power. He has definitively made a choice in favor of Russia and will not become independent in foreign policy.
Dialogue can be conducted with a partner who will adhere to agreements, who makes real steps to improve relations and is able to do them independently.
Lukashenko is no longer able to return to 2019. He will not restore independent media, opposition parties, NGOs, and will not release all political prisoners, will not cancel thousands of illegal sentences, will not want to return hundreds of thousands of Belarusians deported from the country, will not return life to the killed and health to those who are undergoing torture in prisons this minute. It's unrealistic! He suffered the strongest psychological trauma in 2020 — the Belarusians denied him support, and the fear of repeating 2020 will determine his policy.
It is necessary to soberly assess the picture of what is happening in Belarus. And I am convinced that it does not contribute to changing the strategy towards the regime.
Is there a way out? Yes — the approach "No business as usual with Lukashenko". The way out is strong, systematic, and targeted support for Belarusian society, which, if necessary, should be medium and long term. This support should be aimed at changing the political regime in Belarus or changing the policy of this regime. Lukashenko will die tomorrow, it will happen sooner or later, it is inevitable, as is the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. Who will be responsible for changes in the country? It will be the Belarusian people and society, so it is important to invest in Belarusian society.
We propose a dual-direction strategy. This includes depriving Lukashenko of agency and restoring agency to Belarusian society.
How can this be achieved?
1. This requires systematic, stable support for civil society organizations and initiatives primarily directed towards Belarus. It also involves supporting independent media and bloggers. It is crucial not to lose the minds of the democratic majority of Belarusians, otherwise, in a few years, a soldier in Russian uniform might appear on the Polish border, ready to attack Poland. This needs serious resources and daily work. We are leading this effort. However, without systematic support, it would be extremely difficult for us to withstand this.
2. This includes not recognizing Lukashenko — and recognizing the established and functioning system of political institutions of democratic forces in Belarus. A real democratic alternative to the regime: the United Transitional Cabinet and the Coordination Council. This should become our common strategy.
3. We propose that you, our partners, send a clear signal to the elites: there is no future with Lukashenko. This is crucial for key figures within Belarus to understand the inevitability of political change.
4. In turn, to emerge from the political crisis, we will continue to publicly articulate the unacceptability of Lukashenko to the majority of Belarusians. At the same time, it is important to make it clear to the elites that without Lukashenko, a potential field for communication is possible to ensure security and stability during the transition period.
5. Increase the toxicity of Lukashenko by issuing an arrest warrant against him. It must be made clear to the elites around Lukashenko that he is an international criminal and will be held accountable.
Impunity for crimes breeds new, even more terrible crimes. Lukashenko has long been an international criminal, and this can hardly be denied. His crimes pose a threat not only to Belarusians but also to Poland and the entire region.
There are more than enough grounds for the International Criminal Court to issue an arrest warrant against him. This includes his war crimes against Ukrainian children — illegal deportation, and crimes against humanity involving Belarusians, which have a transnational character.
We hope that Poland will not turn a blind eye to this during its presidency of the Council of the European Union. We have prepared all necessary materials for the International Criminal Court. The Lithuanian government has officially approached the ICC's Office of the Prosecutor requesting an investigation into the situation in Belarus and has explicitly stated its intention to seek an arrest warrant for Lukashenko. We expect Poland to support Lithuania's appeal. Otherwise, what else can we believe in? In democracy, in law?
Issuing an arrest warrant for Lukashenko could create conditions for a split in the elites and send a clear signal to his circle that there is no future with Lukashenko. This could be an opportunity in the future to start a dialogue, the so-called roundtable, but without Lukashenko's participation. Undoubtedly, an arrest warrant would also impact Lukashenko's external agency.
6. This involves continuing and intensifying sanction pressure on the Lukashenko regime.
Full harmonization of trade sanctions against the Lukashenko regime and Russia;
Blocking sanctions on all state banks and banks with Russian capital;
Sanctions on all types of fertilizers and liquefied gas (or high protective tariffs);
Broad personal sanctions on judges, propagandists, and senior management of enterprises;
Expansion of control and restrictions on the transit of sanctioned goods.
7. It is also important to maintain the possibility of mobility for Belarusians:
The possibility of communication with European society;
Support in issuing visas to the European Union;
Increasing the number of educational scholarships to create a serious counterbalance to a similar policy conducted by Russia;
Forming personnel for a New Belarus, for which I would like to thank the director of the Centre for Eastern European Studies at the University of Warsaw, Jan Malicki;
Providing additional opportunities to support Belarusian cultural identity both in the EU and in Poland. This is especially relevant in the context of the policy of the Lukashenko regime and Russia to impose the "Russian world" on Belarusians.
8. We are also interested in activating cooperation on issues related to the legalization of the stay of Belarusians in EU countries. As is known, only in Poland, 141,000 Belarusians have already legalized their stay, and about 100,000 are in the process of legalization. This concerns the fact that hundreds of thousands of Belarusians have been forced to leave Belarus since 2020 and are now in the EU. Belarusians do not have the opportunity to get a new passport or extend the current one abroad, as consular institutions are prohibited from issuing documents for the Belarusian diaspora. The possibility of returning to Belarus to obtain documents in most cases means arrest and a political sentence.
Foreign investment from Belarus increased by €1.6 billion in 2023 compared to the previous year. In total, Belarusians have invested around €3.1 billion in the Polish economy. In 2024, there were more than 6,000 business entities with Belarusian roots on the territory of Poland.
9. Do not decide the fate of Belarusians behind our backs.
Nothing about us without us.
I would also like to add that in the case of negotiations on the situation in Ukraine, it is important for us that the voice of Belarusian democratic forces is represented. This can be ensured through direct participation or through the presidency of Poland in the European Union. It is also unacceptable to allow dictator Lukashenko to possible negotiations, as he has completely lost the right to represent the interests of Belarusians and will never restore it.
The situation in Belarus cannot be left hanging in the air and especially cannot be handed over to Russia, simply thrown behind the iron curtain. And I think that a single look at the map is enough to understand why it is necessary to fight for Belarus and Belarusians, their minds.
I propose considering the adoption of a program to support the democratic aspirations of Belarusians in areas such as information, culture, education, legalization, mobility, and support for democratic institutions in exile.
Being in the Polish Sejm, I would like to express my gratitude to Poland, the Polish government, and Polish society for the enormous help that has been provided and continues to be provided, both to the Belarusian society and to the democratic forces.
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