Why do we consistently advocate a strategy of pressure and, I would not be afraid of this word, destruction of the regime of Lukashenko and others like it?
The answer is quite simple: the game of give-in, which has been carried out for decades against the Lukashenko's regime, has ultimately led to the fact that he is one step away from transforming into a completely totalitarian dictatorship and has already stepped beyond the borders of Belarus in committing his terrible, truly terrible and most serious crimes in the understanding of international law.
In this sense, anyone who says that the strategy of pressure on Lukashenko's regime does not work because it has allegedly failed to achieve results in 4 years is making a strategic mistake in his conclusions. Why?
Long-term pressure on Lukashenko, even in its current, still truncated form, has never been applied before. So what are we comparing it to? At the same time, it is precisely the strategy of concessions to Lukashenko's regime, a game of give-in, de-escalation if you will, that not only did not lead to the liberalization, moreover, the democratization of Belarus. Quite the opposite. Behind the visible episodes of a brief «thaw» there was always a readiness to stifle any disobedience by any means. And readiness to go further, to go even beyond the borders of the country in their terror. Up to participation in military aggression. What is happening, because regimes like Lukashenko's are characterized by confidence in their impunity, in the fact that Western democracies are weak, not united, and will sooner or later break and give up their positions. And this confidence is based precisely on the experience of all previous rounds of confrontation with the West. Precisely on the experience of using those strategies of appeasement, give-in, realpolitik, which the West operated.
Even today, it is still impossible to say that some strategy has been finally adopted in relation to the Lukashenko regime and others like it, aimed at stopping them. And if something does not work, it is the lack of such a strategy. With all gratitude to our Western partners for their help, it is worth admitting that they still do not have a coherent strategy, because there is no clearly articulated goal, the desire to achieve which would be clearly demonstrated in action. We are still seeing not only a failure to make proactive decisions, but even a delayed reaction to the actions of aggressive regimes that escalate the situation, constantly raising the stakes. The regime will not go for democratization, because democratization for it, even in a liberal, truncated form, is a path to self-destruction.
The reason for this is very simple. The Lukashenko’s regime and its like understand only the language of force. While Western democracies still have not fully learned it and often still speak to them in a diplomatic dialect, which is perceived by such regimes solely as a manifestation of weakness. And this is important: it is important exactly how your actions are perceived by the enemy, how he reacts to them. It is necessary to analyze exactly this and, in accordance with this, strengthen precisely those actions, those directions that force the enemy to back away. And don't stop, don't leave him room to maneuver. Because as soon as you give him that space, he counterattacks.
The strategy of pressure, forcing the aggressor to fulfill its conditions, bringing it to responsibility — this is an absolutely working strategy. It is precisely because the aggressors themselves exist and act according to the «right of the strong», according to the principle of «who is stronger is right». Therefore, any other strategy with regard to them simply cannot work.
But neither Lukashenko's regime nor Putin's regime has ever adopted and applied the strategy of actions from the position of strength. That is why there is no result. Or rather, it is obvious — this is a full-scale war in Ukraine, this is a hybrid war on the border with the EU and these are mass repressions in Belarus, the most massive in modern history, in the history of post-war Europe.
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