Theses of Pavel Latushka at the international conference Vilnius, September 13
Reasons for sanctions
At the beginning of my speech, I would like to say the following. Over more than 30 years of his rule, Lukashenko has become the world's leading expert on sanctions and he knows perfectly well how to lift them.
But let's first answer the question — why are sanctions and other instruments of external pressure on the Lukashenko’s regime used?
Answer: to change the criminal policy of the state that this regime has captured. Thus, both sanctions and criminal prosecution of the regime lead to the goal of changing the regime's policy, and as a result, democratic changes in Belarus, a change in the system. I think that everyone gathered in the hall today will agree that sanctions are one of the instruments of pressure. But we must admit that we are not using this instrument to the fullest extent.
Sanctions can be most effective when they are applied simultaneously and on a large scale. This approach can shock the political system, and the result comes quickly, which does not lead to long-term negative consequences for the population.
Is it possible to measure the effectiveness of sanctions? It is a difficult question. But the history of sanctions shows that they have an effect. Examples (Poland in the 1980s, as well as other countries of the communist camp, South Africa) show that they led to changes in political systems. And if they did not lead to changes, they forced the regimes to change their policies (for example, the release of political prisoners in Nicaragua).
From the recent history of Belarus, we also know that the introduction of sanctions forced the Lukashenko’s regime to reconsider its policies. After the elections of 2006, 2010, the West introduced sanctions and pressure forced Lukashenko to change his domestic policy. Repressions stopped and political prisoners were released. I emphasize — repressions stopped! This is a change in policy. True, it must be admitted that Lukashenko did not last long.
Today we are seeing an unprecedented scale of repressions. These are the most massive repressions in Europe in the last 50 years. And the regime openly declares: we will not stop them. Anyone who raises their head will lose their head.
In place of the so-called "pardoned" political prisoners, the regime throws the same number of them into prison, and initiates new criminal cases every day. At the same time, Lukashenko expresses grievances that no one thanks him for this and does not lift the sanctions. However, the regime's policy, as we see, does not change. And we are considering exclusively domestic policy.
What does it mean to "change the policy" of Lukashenko's regime today?To do this, we need to understand the whole range of reasons why sanctions were introduced. They were introduced for:
falsification of elections,
mass repressions,
illegal landing of an airplane,
artificially created migration crisis,
complicity in Russian aggression against Ukraine.
And today we note that for none of these reasons are there conditions for lifting the sanctions.
At the same time, sanctions are a very serious problem for Lukashenko's regime. And he has already openly admitted this.
So are sanctions effective? At the moment, they are not effective enough. After all, the regime's policy has not changed.
What to do? Continue and increase the sanctions pressure. There is room for improvement here. The sanctions tool is far from exhausted. At the same time, the longer they are in effect, the stronger the effect of sanctions is. The time factor is also very important here.
Therefore, it is a mistake to say that sanctions are ineffective in principle. The only thing we can say for sure is that they have not changed their policy at this point. Not yet.
Some suggest a different approach. Accept the regime's policy as a given, agree with what is happening in Belarus today. In this case, there are few options left:
The first option. Agree with mass repressions inside Belarus and the establishment of a totalitarian dictatorship, agree with external aggression against Ukraine, destabilization of the borders of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, sabotage in neighboring countries. And this option still does not provide grounds for lifting the sanctions. After all, encouraging such a policy is stupid and harmful. Therefore, this option is out of the question.
The second option. Cancel the sanctions based on cosmetic changes in the regime's domestic policy. However, you and I remember that the regime continues its undeclared hybrid war against the EU, we do not forget that it carries out real acts of sabotage inside the EU, and most importantly, it continues to support Russia's aggression against Ukraine (supply of weapons, everything possible for the Russian Ministry of Defense, destabilization of the situation on the border with Ukraine, facilitates the circumvention of EU and US sanctions imposed on Russia). Therefore, proposals to lift sanctions for cosmetic changes inside are politicking, this is not a relevant approach.
At the same time, we can try to separate sanctions for human rights violations into a separate track. But clear steps are needed to cancel them:
Stop repressions,
Release all political prisoners.
Let's not forget about hundreds of people convicted in absentia, hundreds of thousands deported from the country, illegally seized property, liquidation of all independent media, all 11 opposition political parties, more than 1,700 NGOs, etc.
Third option. Use radical tools. I do not want and will not develop this idea further. Although Lukashenko himself recently said: "The West offers democratic forces to finance armed actions on the territory of Belarus." But we understand that this is propaganda.
Conclusion — there is no alternative to sanctions. It is better to have negative effects from sanctions now than to endure dictatorship and aggressive war for the rest of the time.
However, sanctions should be smarter, which is what we are trying to achieve. Important:
not to isolate society,
not to impose sanctions on consumer goods,
not to restrict people's mobility.
We must isolate the regime, but not Belarusian society. It is important not to contribute to the transformation of Belarus into North Korea 2.0. in the center of Europe. However, we need to increase the effectiveness of sanctions.
What has already been done?
The problem with the effectiveness of sanctions is that sanctions are most effective when they are introduced on a large scale, at one time and quickly. The NAM, which I have headed since 2020, deals with the issues of introducing sanctions against the Lukashenko’s regime. Here, we proposed more than 500 representatives of the regime for the introduction of sanctions. The European Union imposed sanctions on 260 individuals. For example, Poland imposed national sanctions on 340 people — judges, military personnel, members of Lukashenko's parliament, propagandists.
Sectoral sanctions were introduced during this period. Sectoral sanctions are the most effective tool of sanctions pressure. But since 2022, the main problem of circumvention has arisen — the problem of harmonizing sanctions against Russia and the regime in Belarus. To some extent, we have advanced in this matter, and the European Union in July of this year decided to harmonize trade sanctions against the Lukashenko’s regime and Russia. It is important that the sanctions against potash fertilizers were retained. Here we thank the Lithuanian government for its principled position.
We proposed to our EU partners to restrict transit through Belarus to Russia and other countries. In the latest sanctions package, such restrictions were imposed on some dual-use goods.
Based on our proposals, the US imposed sanctions on Lukashenko’s entire fleet. We are grateful to the US government for implementing this approach. Lukashenko’s last aircraft, Air Force One, was sanctioned on August 9 this year.
In addition, in accordance with our proposals to EU Sanctions Commissioner David O’Sullivan, EU restrictions were applied to the Bank of Russia Financial Messaging System (SPFS), the Russian equivalent of SWIFT, which provided the financial infrastructure for sanctions evasion.
Lukashenko is responsible for the illegal removal of Ukrainian children from the occupied territories of Ukraine to Belarus. We initiated sanctions against specific individuals and organizations. And such sanctions were imposed by the US, the EU, Canada and Ukraine. However, it is important to further expand them.
How to increase the effectiveness of sanctions?
Despite the successes, a number of our proposals have not yet found practical application. Western sanctions have a number of shortcomings and loopholes and need to be improved. What else needs to be done?
The key issue remains the issue of monitoring compliance with the imposed sanctions. To this end, when exporting from the EU, it is necessary to apply a mechanism for establishing control over compliance with sanctions, primarily for manufacturers, and with regard to imported goods, it is necessary to combat intermediary firms in third countries.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to make the sanctions regime completely hermetic. Targeted sanctions are usually ineffective, so we propose focusing efforts on expanding sectoral sanctions instead of sanctions against individual enterprises.
In order to combat sanctions circumvention, we also propose applying trade quotas to third countries in the trade volumes that existed before the sanctions were imposed.
It is also necessary to strengthen control over the financial sector. To do this, it is necessary to track payments through Belarus and be prepared to apply secondary sanctions to violators. Here we would like to turn to the United States. In addition, we insist on freezing the regime's assets and including more Belarusian banks in the SDN list as secondary targets of sanctions.
The most effective measure to comply with the sanctions would be to stop the transit of sanctioned goods through the territory of Belarus and Russia. This would be a powerful blow in the current conditions to the infrastructure for bypassing the imposed sanctions and a powerful blow to the economy of the aggressors.
Personal sanctions. Unfortunately, we are forced to state that the possibilities for applying personal sanctions by our partners have not been fully utilized. Sanctions have been imposed on 18 thousand targets of sanctions against Russia and only on 1.5 thousand against the regime in Belarus.
National sanctions are an additional tool. Here we call on Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Ukraine and other countries to use this tool more actively.
To summarize:
We are for expanding sanctions pressure in order to achieve a change in the regime’s policies and democratic changes.
We are for more powerful financial sanctions.
We are for the use of sectoral sanctions.
We are for the full harmonization of EU trade sanctions against Russia and the Lukashenko’s regime.
We are for expanding national sanctions.
We are for expanding the list of personal sanctions.
In addition, it is necessary to apply the instrument of international criminal responsibility. The National Anti-Crisis Management team is working on this. This is a question of issuing an arrest warrant for Lukashenko for crimes against humanity against Belarusians and for a war crime — the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to Belarus. Lukashenko must also be held accountable for the crime of aggression against Ukraine.
This is also a very important tool for changing the regime's policy and further political changes within Belarus. And these changes will come, Belarusian society is ready for them. In this regard, Belarusian society differs from Russian society. Unlike Russians, Belarusians do not support war and dictatorship. We must understand this when developing a separate strategy for the regime in Belarus.
In conclusion, I would like to repeat the following. Over more than 30 years of his rule, Lukashenko has become the main specialist in sanctions and he knows perfectly well how to lift them.
And here is a message for the dictator: "Lukashenko, you know what to do! Stop the repressions and release political prisoners! Stop the hybrid war with the help of migrants and help the aggressor!"
And my message to Western partners is this: we are not asking for F-16s and Leopards, give them to Ukraine as many as possible. Give us the most important tool — the tool of international legal responsibility to split the elites. I am convinced that among his entourage there will be few who want to board the Minsk-Hague train with Lukashenko.
Pavel Latushko: Deputy Head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, Ambassador
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